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In a world fraught with security threats ranging from terrorism to global warming, nothing 
poses a more catastrophic and imminent threat to humanity than the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. It was this realisation that led to the establishment of the Commission on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction which recently brought to the fore a comprehensive list of 
recommendations to free the world of biological, nuclear and chemical arms under four main 
areas of action, namely agreement on principles of action; reduction of the danger of present 
arsenals; prevention of proliferation and working towards the outlawing of weapons of mass 
destruction once and for all. With such a consummate framework in place, it is the 
responsibility and obligation of states to actively engage with and support the 
recommendations of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction and reverse the 
current trend to move away from cooperative multilateralism observed by the Commission’s 
Chairperson, Hans Blix [1].  
With this in mind, in order to ensure their own security whilst concurrently securing the 
global environment, African governments and specifically, the South African government, 
should work to actively support the Commission’s recommendations. South Africa’s advocacy 
for a nuclear weapons-free world was seen by its choice to willingly disarm upon ratification of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 but has, in recent times, been undermined by its 
dogmatic support of Iran’s ‘right to enrich’. The country’s possession of Africa’s only nuclear 
power station and the contentious nature of its nuclear policy confirm its need and 
responsibility to critically engage with the recommendations set out in the Commission’s 
report. The recommendations which are most important for South Africa to support lie within 
the considerations of Africa’s weaknesses, the institutionalisation of non-proliferation and the 
need for complete disarmament. These shall be analysed in detail before examining how these 
recommendations can be supported within the United Nations. Brief remarks on the use of 
incentives will precede conclusive statements on the subject, framing the Commission’s 
Recommendations to the African perspective. 
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Most important recommendations for South Africa to follow and why 
In light of pertinence and relevance of each of the sixty recommendations brought forward by 
the Commission, South Africa’s choice of which recommendations to endorse must be based 
on an awareness of the uniquely African context. 
Africa’s weaknesses 
South Africa must support the recommendations that will most show Africa to be the global 
weak link in freeing the world from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The first of 
these is:  
 
14. States must prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons or fissile 
material.  
 
Since the events of September 11 2001, terrorism has become the greatest common threat 
to human security on the planet. The African Union believes that ‘this unfortunate 
development and all its evil manifestations around the world and particularly in Africa, 
undermine the most cherished values and fundamental principles of the 21st century including 
development, democracy, human rights, and freedoms’ [2]. As non-state actors, terrorist 
organisations operate outside the bounds of international law making the indiscriminate 
wielding of nuclear weapons highly likely; Mutually Assured Destruction ceases to be a factor 
when permanent geographical bounds cannot be delineated. This recommendation to prevent 
terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons must be supported by South Africa due to 
the fact that the capacity to achieve this goal by the use of methods such as the maintenance of 
fully effective accounting and control of all stocks of fissile material is absent in Africa. This 
can been seen by the International Community’s growing concern over the terrorist-
harbouring potential of weak African states in light of the relative ease of unmonitored 
movement of people due to the porous nature of Africa’s borders. The existence of the forces 
such as the A.Q. Khan network whose supply-chain extends into North Africa and the 
numerous terrorist acts such as the US Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya as well as the 
existence of dormant terrorist cells in failed African states such as Somalia are key points of 
note to justify this rising unease. The continent’s ability to prevent terrorists from gaining 
access to nuclear weapons is undoubtedly particularly limited and warrants further 
investigation and bolstering for the benefit of global security and as such, South Africa should 
support the Commission’s recommendation to prevent terrorists from gaining access to 
nuclear weapons. 
Africa’s second area of weakness is in the biological weapons sphere where it has been 
recommended that  
 
35. Governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure effective 
monitoring of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop practical methods of 
coordinating international responses to any major event that might involve 
bioweapons.  
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The African continent is particularly vulnerable to the threat of bioweapons given the fact 
that should these weapons be unleashed on the continent, Africa has little to no capacity to 
identify, monitor and contain these weapons and has climate conditions conducive to the rapid 
spread and accumulation of viral and other infections. Currently, the governments in sub-
Saharan Africa are in a state of panic over the potential Southern Migration of Bird Flu, which 
would pose a serious health risk to the poorly-equipped continent. In South Africa, the 
Department of Health has recently been put on high alert due to the outbreak of a deadly 
mutated strain of drug-resistant tuberculosis. The fact that a considerably large number of 
Africans are immuno-compromised also facilitates the rapid spread of bioweapons. The 
existence of such a weak link extends the threat of bioweapons to the global community at 
large given the airborne nature of these weapons and the increasing mobility of peoples across 
continental divides. In this way, South Africa needs to support this recommendation by 
starting to increase its biosafety standards within the framework of the new International 
Health Regulations of the World Health Organisation. 
Need for administrative and institutional frameworks 
The Commission’s report places great emphasis and value on cooperative action in which 
treaties and international organisations are indispensable tools in achieving our common goal 
of outlawing all weapons of mass destruction. In the African context, given the relative 
weakness of African states in the global political structure, African countries have no option 
but to rely on multi-national frameworks to address issues of mutual concern. South Africa’s 
engagement with the international community has often been within a multi-lateral framework 
and as such, like the Commission, the country has placed great value on the institutional 
framework within which global decision-making takes place. This is in light of the fact that in 
an increasingly globalising world, effective and binding decisions to contain common threats 
cannot take place outside a multilateral setting, indeed, as the Commission suggests, Global 
responses to the threat of proliferation have been the most effective. The country should 
therefore support the Commission’s recommendations which place high premium on the use 
of multi-lateral institutions to arbitrate and discuss modalities for mutually beneficial 
cooperation. These recommendations are; 
 
8. States should make active use of the IAEA as a forum for exploring various ways to 
reduce proliferation risks connected with the nuclear fuel cycle.  
 
42. States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should use the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as a coordinating center in the 
development of global standards for a chemical industry security culture.  
 
4. The states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should establish a standing 
secretariat to handle administrative matters for the parties to the treaty.  
 
60. The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its potential to 
reduce and eliminate threat of weapons of mass destruction.  
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Towards complete disarmament 
The final category of recommendations that South Africa must support are those 
recommendations which lead towards complete nuclear disarmament;  
 
20. All states possessing nuclear weapons must address the issue of their continued 
possession of such weapons.  
 
This recommendation should be at the heart of South Africa’s nuclear policy as the 
country has demonstrated that security can still be maintained without the possession of 
nuclear arms. Indeed, as the Commission projects: 
 
30. All states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning for security 
without nuclear weapons. They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear 
weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that included definitions, 
benchmarks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament.  
 
These two recommendations are at the very core of what the Commission on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction stands for and embody the commission’s ultimate vision. For this reason 
alone, all countries including South Africa, must work to actively endorse these steps towards 
the complete nuclear disarmament of the world. This is particularly true of volatile regions 
such as the Middle East where the threat of nuclear proliferation is particularly eminent given 
the historical animosity between Israel and the Arab bloc as well as the persistent displays of 
violence exhibited in the region. However, insistence on a nuclear-free Middle East for 
example cannot be morally or legally enforced as long as nuclear weapons continue to be 
present elsewhere. The presence of double-standards within the global community strikes at 
the heart of Africa’s concerns with the current global system and the deep sense of moral 
justice embodied in the religious tensions within the Middle East nuance the conflict to an 
elevated state of volatility. Conclusively, wherever they are housed, the world cannot be truly 
free from threat as long as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons still exist and as long as a 
single state is in possession of these weapons, the world can never be safe. 
Methods to promote these recommendations within the United Nations 
As the premier institution for international cooperation and engagement, the United Nations 
has a great role to play as a forum for the discussion and arbitration of matters of global 
concern, including the threat of nuclear proliferation. There are various methods through 
which South Africa can promote support for the above-mentioned recommendations within 
the United Nations. This is in light of the fact that the country has recently been awarded a 
two year non-permanent seat on the influential United Nations Security Council starting in 
January 2007. In this capacity, South Africa can work to push the agenda of the Commission 
on Weapons of Mass Destruction using its moral weight as a state which willingly gave up its 
own nuclear program to sway public opinion. The existence of specialised subsidiary bodies 
within the Security Council, including the UN monitoring, verification and inspection 
commission are also areas in which South Africa can actively endorse the recommendations of 
the commission within the United Nations.  
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 Other methods to sway policy and lobby within the United Nations are available. 
These include active debates within the General Assembly that bring the issue of non-
proliferation to the fore. South Africa can also use its South-South cooperation networks to 
help set a collective agenda for the developing world geared towards the support of the above-
mentioned recommendations within the United Nations. The decision-making structure and 
modus-operandus of the United Nations has a wide scope of avenues for the tabling and 
critical engagement of issues of global concern. However, the most pertinent channel to 
address and promote the recommendations of the Commission is the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) which deals specifically with matters of nuclear proliferation. The 
concert of agencies, subsidiary bodies, programs and funds, specialised agencies and 
departments within the secretariat of the United Nations can each be a pertinent forum for 
specific recommendations to be endorsed and championed. 
On the use of incentives 
A key area of concern is on the use of incentives as a deterrent against nuclear enrichment. 
Recommendation 38 for example, mentions that ‘state parties should continue to offer states 
positive incentives, including technical assistance, to join and implement the Chemical 
Weapons Convention’. I am alarmed that such a practice will set a dangerous precedent 
especially considering the rise in terrorism and the nature of ‘rogue states’. An illustrative case 
in point here would be the Iranian debacle. In June 2006 the United States, China, Russia, 
France, Germany and Britain offered Iran a comprehensive set of political and economic 
incentives to cease its enrichment of uranium [3]. Iran’s recent response issued in September 
2006 shows how the use of incentives in this manner neutralises the deterrent effects of the 
threat of sanctions by giving Iran an alternative cause for ceasing enrichment. Should the 
incentives be taken up by Iran, the country, through effectively wielding the threat of nuclear 
proliferation, will come out of the incident having gained more than it would have had it not 
contemplated uranium enrichment in the first place. The precedent set in this case will be 
highly alarming as the threat of uranium enrichment can consequently be indiscriminately used 
by rogue states for the advancement of their own agendas in a manner akin to holding the 
world at ransom. I would therefore propose that incentives be removed from any negotiation 
package with states that pose a nuclear threat to send a clear message that such behaviour will 
not be rewarded or condoned in any manner and that the international community will always 
consistently take a firm stance on any attempts towards nuclear enrichment by any state in the 
future. 
Conclusion 
The greatest travesty in human history has been the manner in which over 128 million 
innocent lives were taken in the previous World Wars. These wars displayed man’s destructive 
capability and how this defies the considerations of constraint, reason and common humanity. 
This capability and the continued presence of sources of conflict amongst peoples dispels the 
myth of ‘democratic peace’ and nullifies the notion that nuclear arms merely serve as a 
disincentive for attack; these weapons have been wielded before and could once again be 
unleashed upon the world in the future. The potentially cataclysmic effects of such an action 
should be a driving force for the peoples of the world to unite against the continued existence 
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of nuclear arsenals in any shape or form. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
provides an analytical framework within which states can engage in order to rid the world of 
the sceptre of nuclear arms. As Hans Blix states, ‘the commission has not aimed at utopian 
goals but has ardently and jointly sought to exercise judgment and point to constructive 
avenues out of difficulties, which are still with us’ [1]. It is for these reasons that people from 
all walks of life must support the recommendations put forward by the commission to leave 
future generations with a legacy of peace, security and constructive engagement in the 
resolution global challenges. 
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